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ABSTRACT 
We present the preferences 
for environmental regulatory reform expressed by 30 UK businesses and industry bodies 
from 5 sectors.  While five strongly preferred voluntary regulation, seven expressed doubts 
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about its effectiveness, and 18 expressed no general preference between instrument types.  
Voluntary approaches were valued for flexibility and lower burdens, but direct regulation 
offered stability and a level playing field.  Respondents sought regulatory frameworks that: 
are coherent; balance clarity, prescription and flexibility; are enabled by positive regulatory 
relationships; administratively efficient; targeted according to risk magnitude and character; 
evidence-based and that deliver long-term market stability for regulatees.  Anticipated 
differences in performance between types of instrument can be undermined by poor 
implementation.  Results underline the need for policy makers and regulators to tailor an 
effective mix of instruments for a given sector, and to overcome analytical, institutional and 
political barriers to greater coherence, to better coordinate existing instruments and tackle 
new environmental challenges as they emerge. 
 
KEYWORDS 
environmental policy, regulation, regulatory reform, instrument selection 
3 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over recent decades, governments in developed countries have put in place 
substantial bodies of environmental regulation, which have improved important elements of 
environmental quality and delivered significant benefits to society.  This period has also seen 
sustained government effort to reform regulation, to reduce costs to business and enable 
economic growth. One focus of regulatory design and reform has been the choice of 
regulatory instrument (e.g. direct regulation, taxes, self-regulation); others include improving 
administrative efficiency (e.g. through simplifying compliance processes) and improving 
coherence (e.g. through integrated permits). Policy makers and regulators may choose to 
engage with industry to understand calls for regulatory reform, identify where problems lie 
and seek ideas for improvement. However, business views on regulatory reform are rarely 
explored directly by researchers. This study aims to address this gap by characterising the 
dimensions of reforms sought by a sample of business representatives. 
Today governments can choose from a wide range of policy or regulatory instruments 
to protect or enhance the environment (Table 1).  Here, the term “regulation” includes 
government and (non-state) governance (Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999) and “instruments” 
means the component parts of regulation (Taylor et al., 2012). 
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Table 1. Instruments available to policy makers and regulators (Taylor et al., 2012) 
Type Variant 
Direct “command and control” regulation Ambient pollution requirements 
Input restrictions and output quotas 
Non-transferable emission licences 
Technology controls 
Zoning/ location controls 
Economic instruments Taxes and subsidies 
Tradable rights 
Payments 
Information based instruments Targeted information provision 
Naming and shaming/faming 
Registration, labelling and certification 
Co-regulation and self-regulation Voluntary regulation 
Covenants and negotiated agreements 
Private corporate regulation 
Private professional regulation 
Self-regulation 
Civic regulation 
Support and capacity building Research and knowledge generation 
Demonstration projects/ knowledge diffusion 
Network building and joint problem solving 
 
Instruments are compared on the basis of their effectiveness in achieving intended outcomes 
(e.g. protecting environmental water quality, reducing atmospheric pollution, or resource 
consumption) and the efficiency, and fairness, with which they do so.  While direct regulation 
has delivered significant improvements, it has been criticised for poor efficiency compared to 
alternatives that offer greater flexibility to business on how to achieve environmental 
objectives (Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999).  Governments use these alternatives to harness 
the effect of social forces on business and citizen behaviour; such as consumer choice, or the 
influence of businesses on one another through the value chain.  Commentators describe this 
as a shift from “government” to “governance” (Jordan et al., 2005), while calling for the 
purposeful design of coherent mixes of instruments (Braathen, 2007; Gunningham and 
Sinclair, 1999; Howlett and Rayner, 2007).  A growing literature examines the performance 
of different types of instrument, typically founded in economics, though we contend that ex-
post evaluations assessing instrument effectiveness are frequently lacking (Taylor et al., 
2012). 
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Regulation should be risk-informed, so that resources are targeted for maximum 
impact.  Risk analysis scholars have examined governments’ characterisation and 
prioritisation of strategic risks, (e.g. public exposure to engineered nanomaterials, the spread 
of foot and mouth disease, and flooding (Prpich et al., 2011)) and regulatory agencies’ risk-
based regulation for different industries, businesses and sites (Gouldson et al., 2009).  A 
substantial literature examines the enforcement strategies of government agencies, including 
advice and persuasion, rules and deterrence, smart, risk-based or meta-regulation 
(Gunningham, 2011), the deployment of which, in concert, is a “regulatory craft” (Sparrow, 
2008, 2000).  Research exploring the role of personal interactions between regulators and the 
regulated is more limited (May and Winter, 1999; Pautz and Wamsley, 2012; Sevä and 
Jagers, 2013; Sparrow, 2008). 
There is a developing international consensus on how governments should design and 
manage regulation to optimise performance. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) recommends governments (i) commit to a “whole-of-government” 
policy for regulatory quality; (ii) adhere to principles of open government; (iii) establish 
oversight institutions; (iv) integrate regulatory impact assessment and consider means other 
than regulation; (v) review the stock of regulation; (vi) report on regulatory performance; 
(vii) have consistent policy covering the role and functions of regulatory agencies; (viii) 
ensure effectiveness of regulatory agencies and the legal system; (ix) apply risk assessment, 
management and communication strategies; (x) promote coherence; (xi) foster regulatory 
management capacity; and (xii) cooperate internationally (OECD, 2012).  National 
governments have pursued broad reforms.  The Dutch Administrative Burden Reduction 
Programme, considered a world leader by the World Bank Group (Ladegaard et al., 2007), 
included a 25% burden reduction target, linked reform to the budgetary cycle and established 
an independent monitoring body (Actal, 2013).  In the US, Executive Order (EO) 13563 
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(Obama, 2011a) provides principles for improving regulation and regulatory review, while 
EO 13576 (Obama, 2011b) commits the Federal government to ongoing improvements in 
efficiency.  In response, the US Environmental Protection Agency has established a rolling 
programme of reviews for existing regulations (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2014).  
In the UK, the ‘Red Tape Challenge’ (Cabinet Office, 2013) seeks to reduce burdens by 
improving or removing regulations.  The UK government has a stated preference 
(Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2013a) for alternatives to direct regulation 
across all policy areas and requires alternatives to be considered by policy makers 
(Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2013b).  Governments have also pursued 
regulatory reform to improve policy integration.  The Swedish Environmental Code 
consolidated fragmented regulation, implemented new processes and institutions, and 
provided a platform for further improvement (OECD, 2004).  European Union reforms, 
intended to improve integration, include the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 
(IPPC) Directive for controlling emissions from installations through permitting, leading to 
the Industrial Emissions Directive (European Parliament, 2010); and consolidation of 
chemicals regulation under the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH) Regulation (European Commission, 2013). 
While these initiatives attempt to rationalise the considerable stock of regulation, 
significant challenges remain.  Scholars note the focus has moved from local or regional 
concerns such as smog and eutrophic rivers, to broader systemic issues such as climate 
change; and from immediate visible impacts to those with diffuse or delayed consequences.  
The science base has revealed the interconnectedness of environmental pressures (Rayner, 
2006).  New institutions of representative democracy imbued with regulatory authority to 
track new issues will be required to tackle global environmental concerns (Rayner, 2006) and 
ensure realistic courses of local and international action (Rayner, 2010).  To improve the 
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quality of this debate and guide policy staff on how to target regulatory reform effort, better 
evidence on what instruments have and could work when, with whom, and why is required.  
This is intensified by the need to respond to strong pressures for regulatory reform in 
developed nations attempting to recover from recent economic stagnation and concerned for 
their international competitiveness. The business community is an important source, although 
their views will inevitably by partial and should be balanced with voices of other stakeholder 
groups.  Given the costs of regulation for business, one might hypothesise that business 
would argue for less regulation, which could undermine environmental protection, and limit 
the scope for alternatives that place greater responsibility in their hands.  This study explores 
how businesses may respond to regulatory reform: 1) what arguments are made for the 
suitability of different forms of regulation?; 2) what other priorities for reform are 
emphasised?; and 3) what do these responses imply for future regulatory reform 
programmes? 
 
2. METHODS 
A multi-case study approach was adopted, employing semi-structured interviews with 
senior business representatives and executive representatives of trade bodies with an intimate 
understanding of their sector.  This approach has been widely used for testing and extending 
theory; each case analogous to an individual experiment (Yin, 2009).  Semi-structured 
interviews, averaging 1 hour in length, allowed respondents to reveal opinions and their 
attending explanations (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  Respondents were presented with a 
typology of instruments (Table 1, with additional explanation), invited to comment on 
whether it included the main forms of regulation of which they were aware, to provide 
examples of regulations that worked well, or less well, and explain why, and comment on the 
need for regulatory reform.  Five industries spanned a range of environmental regulations and 
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risk: (i) construction and construction products; (ii) food and agriculture; (iii) personal care 
products; (iv) waste management and (v) water collection, treatment, supply and management 
(Table SI1).  Interviews  (n=30) were conducted between January and June 2013, this sample 
size deemed sufficient given the organisational and representational roles that the highly-
experienced interviewees were in; given their depth of knowledge of the regulatory reform 
agenda; and mirroring methods deployed in similar appraisals from the policy literature 
where the views of a diverse set of interviewees are explored on a tightly scoped question set 
(e.g. see Tribbia and Moser, 2008).  A cross section of business sectors of differing maturity 
was explored; these sectors representing experience across a variety of approaches to the 
regulation of risk, including those with an established convention in the use of industry codes 
and standards (construction); those with extended supply chains and with international 
standards in place (food and agriculture, personal care products); those where formalised, 
regulatory risk assessment played a long established role (personal care products, to an extent 
waste management) and those in transition towards formalised enterprise risk management 
(e.g. water, waste management).  The rationale was to capture views from sectors with 
differing levels of risk management maturity, philosophies of approach to managing 
regulatory risk and that had been regulated using a range of tools from the taxonomy we have 
described previously (Taylor et al., 2012, 2013). 
Organisations that had previously contributed to a regulatory reform programme were 
invited to participate under a covering letter explaining that the research was being 
undertaken independently. These cases were supplemented with a small number of additional 
organisations, to provide a range of contexts in which theories concerning environmental 
regulation could be developed and tested.  Thirty-four interviewees from 30 organisations 
were interviewed in depth.  Interviews were transcribed verbatim, except in one case where 
written notes were taken and validated with the respondent.  Transcripts and notes were 
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iteratively coded using NVIVO™ Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software 
(CAQDAS) (Bazeley, 2007). Transcripts were initially tagged according to recurring words 
or themes (e.g. “risk”, “clarity”) to allow the full breadth of concepts discussed to emerge 
from the data. These were then grouped into major explanatory themes (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994), which in turn were refined and summarised,  while recognising the 
author’s “theoretical sensitivity” (Kelle, 2005) to prior research (Taylor et al., 2012, 2013).  
Detailed data tables are provided in the Supporting Information (SI). 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 Perhaps the most comprehensive account of the maturity and capacity of larger 
regulatory firms within a sector to respond to the new regulatory agenda is offered by 
Gunningham and Sinclair in “Leaders and Laggards” (Gunningham and Sinclair, 2002) .  
Many of their conclusions still hold and, in brief, these authors point to the importance of 
purposeful regulatory design; the effectiveness of a combined mix of instruments for large 
enterprises, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach; a fit-for-purpose approach to regulatory 
design and we believe the character of the risk (e.g. Sparrow, 2008) to be essential here; and 
the onward need for a judicial requirement for command and control as a backstop against 
free-riders.  In the context of this prior art, we are concerned here in the next level of 
discussion, in the UK context, of how these generalised facets might play out across the 
sectors studied. 
Industry views on the suitability of regulatory instruments 
Respondents were shown a typology of regulatory instruments (constructed from prior 
research (Taylor et al., 2012) and tested with policy makers (Taylor et al., 2013)) and asked 
whether they considered it comprehensive. Their comments (Table SI2) provide further 
evidence that, with refinement, this typology provides a sound basis for the full range of 
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instruments available to policy makers and regulators.  Respondents’ views on the suitability 
and performance of different forms of regulation were diverse (Table SI3).  Respondents 
from 18 organisations did not show a clear preference between instrument types; instead, 
seeing merit in a purposeful mix of types depending on circumstances.  Seven expressed 
scepticism about the effectiveness of voluntary and self-regulation, arguing that direct 
regulation was necessary to tackle poor environmental performance within their sector, 
nationally or internationally, so to achieve a “level playing field”.  Five respondents favoured 
voluntary approaches over additional direct regulation for their flexibility and goodness of fit 
to industry characteristics, while some expressed concern that further direct regulation would 
risk undermining their international competitiveness, pushing small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) out of business.  Comparison of views of respondents from the same 
sector (Table SI3, summarised in Table 2) hints at industry- and business-specific 
characteristics that may influence these preferences. 
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Table 2. Comparison of views across sectors 
Sector Summary of views expressed by respondents 
Construction and 
construction products 
Direct regulation argued for by large constructors, concerned that (smaller) competitors 
and supply chain participants will not adopt voluntary approaches, leading to 
reputational risks and an unlevel playing field.  Beyond-compliance behaviour driven 
by customer demands (including government) among large constructors.  Construction 
materials respondents concerned about coherence of land management regulations.  For 
construction materials, direct regulation can provide easily implementable rules and a 
framework within which other types of instrument, including industry led approaches, 
have flourished. 
Food and agriculture Direct regulation necessary in some circumstances to protect public good, but must be 
deployed with care to avoid undermining competitiveness.  Large retailers driven more 
by consumer demand for environmental performance beyond compliance, which exerts 
pressure on the supply chain. Voluntary approaches strongly favoured by respondents 
arguing the sector is heavily regulated by government and the supply chain, expressing 
fears of direct regulation leading to economic disadvantage in international competition. 
Personal care 
products 
Views mixed, reflecting varying characteristics along supply chains. Direct regulation 
via permits argued as optimal for industrial plants, and necessary to provide an 
international level playing field.  Sectoral track record of voluntary activity (e.g. on 
HFCs, fragrance safety) demonstrates scope for self-regulation. 
Waste management Direct regulation has provided the platform on which the industry has developed.  
Enforced direct regulation is required to tackle a minority of poor performing operators, 
alongside earned recognition for more reputable operators. Voluntary approaches 
appropriate for tackling resource efficiency and producer responsibility, where direct 
regulation would be complex; but has proved unsuccessful in other areas. 
Water management, 
collection, treatment 
and supply 
Direct regulation provides stability for investment planning, and necessary controls for 
some high risk activities. Within this framework greater flexibility to voluntarily try out 
new approaches and earned recognition would be welcomed, accommodated by good 
relationships with regulators. Regulation that accommodates local decision making and 
accountability necessary for flood management. 
 
These results suggest the structure of the business sector, the capability and attitude towards 
compliance of its members, the degree of national and international competition and the 
degree to which regulations are tailored to the sector all play a part in shaping attitudes 
towards intervention.  Further research would be required to reliably reveal preferences of 
industry sectors as a whole (e.g. as undertaken by Lüthi and Wüstenhagen for photovoltaic 
project developers) (Lüthi and Wüstenhagen, 2012). While case study organisations 
considered the choice of regulatory instrument to be an important aspect of regulatory design, 
other areas for improvement were also emphasised (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Themes in addition to instrument selection discussed by interviewees 
 
Coherent regulatory frameworks 
Incoherence in regulatory frameworks has been highlighted by others, where new 
regulations have been layered across existing regimes, nationally and internationally (Rayner 
and Howlett, 2009; UKELA, 2012).  Nearly all participants in this study discussed coherence, 
providing evidence of its importance for effectiveness and efficiency.  Coherent instruments 
support one another in a complementary mix.  For example, construction site waste 
management plans (SWMPs) were thought to have encouraged builders to pay closer 
attention to waste streams, enhancing the impact of the Landfill Tax (The Landfill Tax 
(Amendment) Regulations 2013. SI 2013/658, 2013) and to have become incorporated into 
other construction standards.  The Building Regulations (The Building (Amendment) 
Regulations 2013. SI 2013/1105, 2013) were argued to have enabled development of many 
supporting instruments, including third-party inspection and product labelling.  Third party 
auditing of environmental performance has been relied upon to allow reduced inspections in 
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high performing poultry farms (Defra, 2013a).  Respondents emphasised the need for tailored 
interventions to cater for big and small businesses, and leading and poor performing 
businesses within a sector.  The need for a mix of instruments to tackle critical points in 
supply chains was emphasised; for example, to ensure that good environmental performance 
is designed into construction projects from the outset.  For waste recycling, respondents 
discussed the need for a mix of instruments along the waste stream; to increase producer 
responsibility for minimising waste and encouraging re-use; to provide coherent messages to 
consumers about what can be recycled; to improve the consistency and performance of 
recycling facilities between local authorities; and to provide confidence in the standard of 
recycled materials.  For the water sector, influencing the upstream behaviour of individuals 
and businesses, for example in pesticide use or in the disposal of household products and 
pharmaceuticals down drains, was considered important alongside regulating water quality 
downstream, with the potential to reduce treatment costs. 
Several respondents complained of inconsistent or overlapping requirements set by 
national bodies in various policy areas, including between planning permission and 
environmental permits for quarrying, in carbon reduction policies for construction, and in 
carbon reduction, waste treatment and water quality requirements for water companies.  One 
respondent from the minerals industry argued that the primacy of the local land use and 
construction planning system, to make judgements that account for all local competing and 
influencing matters, had been undermined by the requirement for site-specific environmental 
permits.  Similar issues were reported for international inconsistencies; for example, in the 
labelling of chemicals, or methods for carbon reporting set by different countries.  
Overlapping requirements can arise among those set by industry; for example, for farms 
supplying multiple food retailers, each with their own set of standards.  While some examples 
of coherent policy were highlighted (e.g. permitting of industrial installations, including 
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incinerators; and building regulations), perceived incoherence was attributed typically to the 
failure of government to work together internationally, nationally or locally to reconcile 
conflicting objectives, or by deciding to implement new regimes rather than incorporate new 
requirements into existing frameworks.  While governments have pursued various initiatives 
to improve integration (Gray et al., 2007; OECD, 2004), for these respondents there is scope 
to go further, which is likely to require better national and international integrated governance 
structures that encourage or force politicians, policy makers and regulators to coordinate 
better on policy and regulatory design (Rayner and Howlett, 2009). 
 
Clarity, prescription and flexibility 
Regulators have been encouraged to ensure rules are clearly articulated and easy to 
understand, so to increase effectiveness and reduce costs (Dutch Ministry of Justice, 2004; 
Hampton, 2005). Instruments that afford flexibility to businesses to decide how to achieve 
objectives encourage innovation and improve cost-efficiency, for example through 
“performance based standards” (Coglianese et al., 2002) or within voluntary agreements 
(Bressers and de Bruijn, 2005).  However, greater flexibility may not be appropriate for firms 
with less resource to expend on designing measures for compliance, who may prefer 
prescriptive regulation that tells them what they need to do (Coglianese et al., 2002; Fairman 
and Yapp, 2005).  The themes of clarity, prescription and the degree of flexibility left for 
innovation by the regulated are therefore intertwined and were often discussed together. 
Most respondents discussed clarity in the design of regulatory instruments.  Clear 
objectives were expected to lead to well designed instruments, the performance of which 
could be assessed easily.  One respondent from the farming sector believed the Voluntary 
Initiative on pesticide use (Defra, 2006) was especially effective because requirements for 
spraying are clearly explained and readily applied.  Two respondents from the construction 
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industry agreed that the Oil Storage Regulations (The Control of Pollution (Oil Storage) 
(England) Regulations 2001. SI 2001/2954, 2001) were effective because requirements for 
storage bunding were easily communicated and checked.  Respondents also sought clarity in 
definitions that delineate the boundaries of who is affected by regulations.  One respondent 
described the introduction of permits for the operation of waste incinerators, which were clear 
in what operations were in scope and what would be required, enabling businesses to ensure 
compliance was achieved.  In contrast, the definitions of what is meant by “waste”, when 
deposition of material in the ground may be considered to be landscape “restoration” or waste 
“disposal”, and what constitutes “incidental” contamination of inert waste or organic waste 
were highlighted as points of contention leading to uncertainty about compliance.  However, 
other respondents called for greater flexibility and less prescription in regulatory instruments.  
Flexibility can accommodate local conditions; for example, to allow a local assessment of 
optimal biodiversity measures rather than standard requirements.  For personal care products, 
flexibility was argued for to ensure expert judgement informed the safe levels of chemicals 
for the intended use of a product.  The need for flexibility to accommodate process 
innovation in rapidly changing waste technologies, or improvements to water treatment 
operations was also emphasised.  In the latter, regulations based on achieving outcomes (e.g. 
safe drinking water) rather than controlling inputs (e.g. specific water treatment technologies) 
were called for.  Where instruments have clear high level objectives, but room for 
interpretation on how these should be achieved, agencies may choose or be required to 
provide clarifying guidance, which reportedly can allow the scope of regulations to creep 
beyond that originally intended (if guidance becomes treated as a regulatory requirement), 
and lead to inconsistency in regulatory decisions - both unwelcome among respondents. 
These results reinforce the need for the level of prescription and flexibility in regulation to be 
tailored to the capability of the target audience.  Policy makers and regulators should 
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carefully tailor the level of prescription in rules and guidance according to the capability of 
regulated industries to innovate effective solutions. 
 
Positive regulatory relationships  
While a body of research examines regulatory compliance and enforcement strategies 
(Gunningham, 2011), little research has focused on the relationship between regulatory 
officers and the regulated, although recent work in the US (Pautz and Wamsley, 2012; Pautz, 
2010a, 2009) has provided empirical support for the observation (Lange and Gouldson, 2010) 
that mutual trust is necessary for modern forms of environmental governance.  Respondents 
provided insight into how the quality of the relationship between regulator and regulatee 
affects how regulatees respond.  For example, a farmer described improvements in the 
relationship with local regulators since they have become more open to farmers’ needs 
beyond environmental protection objectives.  Water sector respondents described close 
working relationships with regulators and government officials on long term planning issues, 
and welcomed opportunities to work together to take the sector forward.  One commented: 
"Having a positive and pro-active relationship works well, as working together is as much 
about leadership principles as technical issues. Key to this is involvement and open dialogue 
from the outset, as this then engenders ownership and responsibility.  What benefits all 
parties most is a mature relationship, and everything that goes with that maturity, rather than 
a parent and child relationship." 
Respondents valued easy access to regulators to clarify requirements.  However, 
where respondents believed regulators lacked understanding of their sector, or found 
decisions to lack transparency or accountability, this undermined working relationships.  
Several respondents complained of a lack of consistency between the decisions made by 
individual officers, between officers in different regions, and in one case between different 
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countries, leading to additional effort to resolve decisions.  Inconsistency was often linked to 
a lack of clarity in regulations, leaving too much scope for interpretation, and was most 
apparent to nationally operating businesses.  Echoing previous research, these results suggest 
that trust may be undermined by regulatees’ perceptions of inconsistency or lack of 
understanding among regulators, but that constructive working relationships have also been 
successfully established. 
 
Risk based regulation 
Scholars have examined various dimensions of risk based regulation for 
environmental protection, including strategic risk analysis by policy makers (Prpich et al., 
2011), risk-based prioritisation of substances for regulation (Egeghy et al., 2011) and risk-
based interventions by regulatory agencies (Gouldson et al., 2009). Respondents from all case 
study areas discussed the role of risk analysis in regulation, mostly for individual regulated 
sites.  One argued the environmental permitting regime for industrial installations was 
successful as it provided for the determination, by the regulator, of the most appropriate 
emission limits on a site-specific basis.  Respondents from the water sector argued there was 
scope to better target permit requirements on discharges from different types of source 
according to risk associated and local conditions.  The need for risk-based inspections was 
highlighted by several respondents.  In farming, the “earned recognition” approach (Defra, 
2013a), which reduces inspections for good performing sites where other third party 
inspections are in place, was welcomed.  However, one respondent argued that inspection 
was not generally risk-based and, instead, tended to target larger farms that performed well, 
while neglecting smaller farms that needed more support to improve compliance.  
Meanwhile, a waste management respondent applauded the efforts of regulators to target 
effort against waste criminals using proactive evidence-gathering and action. 
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Some questioned whether the relative prioritisation of government policy areas was risk 
based arguing, for example, that regulatory effort should focus on the preservation of habitats 
rather than specific species, on food waste and other elements of sustainable consumption and 
production rather than carrier bags, and questioning whether the level of regulation for the 
water and waste industries were proportionate to their associated risks.  In the personal care 
products sector, risk assessment of chemical components and mixtures is a central concern of 
direct regulations such as REACH as well as voluntary codes such as the International 
Fragrance Association (IFRA) standards.  One respondent expressed concern that REACH 
was tending towards hazard rather than risk based regulation, resulting in regulatory effort 
from industry and government not focusing on exposures that presented the greatest risk.  
Uncertainty surrounding the impact of nanomaterials on the natural environment was 
highlighted by another respondent. 
 
Administrative efficiency 
The design of regulatory administrative systems was highlighted by several 
respondents as an important cause of irritation.  For example, the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment Energy Efficiency Scheme, a hybrid instrument that originally incorporated an 
emissions trading system and performance league table, was thought by one respondent to 
have been effective in raising awareness of the costs of energy among managers, while two 
other respondents thought that it had been over-complex and that a simple tax would prove 
more effective. Regarding trading schemes, one respondent commented: 
"They do seem to get terribly bogged down in definitional issues and trading arrangements 
and different exchanges and buy out clauses. To the extent where in almost all of the cases 
that I have worked on, the businesses affected end up saying, “Just give us a tax. We have to 
employ people just to try and account for our [trading scheme] exposure, or whatever.”...I 
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must admit, as a policy person, I always liked the idea of trading schemes as a good thing 
and I thought it was good that the UK tended to do more of that than other countries. But it 
does seem, in practice, it gets very hard.".  
Some respondents engaged in the planning system and the regulation of farming 
highlighted issues of unnecessary bureaucracy and “box ticking”.  Several respondents from 
the personal care products sector commented on the design of the EU REACH regulation, 
expressing the view that while the underlying principle of the regulation was good, the 
regulation is not well designed and in implementation has become excessively bureaucratic, 
although views on the severity of this problem varied.  According to one respondent, similar 
issues can arise with voluntary approaches, commenting: 
"I also tend to find, certainly at government and trade association level, perhaps with the 
company level, voluntary agreements seem to be just as time consuming and bureaucratic as 
traditional regulation. Whereas, obviously, the idea is that they are much more, sort of, light 
touch."  
Three respondents from the waste industry saw potential in the use of information 
technology to improve regulatory efficiency, by making permit applications as “point and 
click” as possible, enabling information sharing with regulators through a web portal, and by 
developing a mobile phone app that could tell consumers whether particular materials could 
be recycled in their area. 
These results support other research indicating that direct regulation and alternatives 
can impose significant administrative costs on participants (Dinica et al., 2007; Krarup and 
Ramesohl, 2002; Sovacool, 2011). While these costs need to be weighed against the wider 
social benefits of regulation, for participants in this study, poor implementation of 
administrative systems was a significant cause of concern. Recent government initiatives 
have sought to improve the ease with which regulatees can find out about and report on 
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regulation (Defra, 2013b; Netherlands Government, 2013), and greater adoption of service 
design techniques such as “customer journey mapping” (Heapy and Parker, 2006; Macdonald 
et al., 2011) could prove beneficial, though its potential is under-researched. 
 
Evidence-based policy 
Scholars and governments have frequently called for policy to be evidence-based 
(Solesbury, 2001), and the brokering of scientific evidence that support’s regulatory 
approvals featured in many interviews.  One trade association described their role in 
gathering evidence to persuade local authorities and recycling businesses to recycle their 
members’ products, so to meet their producer responsibility obligations.  Another described 
gathering evidence on the carbon impact of their members’ products, in anticipation of future 
scrutiny.  Respondents from the personal care products sector discussed the central role of 
environmental and health risks in the regulation of chemicals.  In general, where evidence for 
the beneficial environmental impact of regulation was lacking, respondents anticipated that 
businesses would be less willing to comply than when compelling evidence had been 
presented.  One respondent argued that farmers would feel more motivated to tackle 
environmental problems when evidence was provided of local impacts, a view echoed by 
another who emphasised the importance of evidence to support the regulation of pesticides.  
Some respondents thought the UK government should review more systematically the 
effectiveness and efficiency of regulation, with one commenting: 
"Businesses, private companies always put a lot of effort in to that process of doing project 
review and a post project assessment. Did you achieve what you set out to achieve? It’s good 
business management. I don’t think we have the same rigour with the decisions which are 
made by government on policy making and regulation." 
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These results support the theory that normative motivations for compliance with 
regulation are significant among businesses (May, 2005; Winter and May, 2001) and link this 
motivation to the need for policy to be demonstrably evidence-based (Solesbury, 2001). They 
illustrate the role that regulatory actors can play in developing and brokering evidence to 
motivate action (Davies et al., 2010). 
 
Long-term stability 
Respondents from the waste management, construction and water industries 
emphasised the importance of long-term stability in the regulatory framework to enable 
businesses to invest in new infrastructure.  The Landfill Tax, which provides a predictably 
escalating tax on putting waste to landfill, was considered to have been effective in providing 
businesses with the confidence to invest in alternative waste infrastructure.  In the case of 
construction materials, the Building Regulations were argued to have provided long-term 
certainty in the objectives of government, for example regarding Zero Carbon Homes 
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 2013), while encouraging innovation 
through triennial reviews of product standards.  In contrast, the respondent representing the 
views of suppliers to the water industry argued that the five-yearly review of water industry 
plans by regulators resulted in a cycle of “boom and bust” that raised the overall costs of 
water supply to consumers.  These results echo the finance industry’s calls for a “long, loud 
and legal” policy framework to encourage investment in renewable energy (UNEP SEFI, 
2004), where long-term stability has been found to be a critical factor for policy effectiveness 
(Bürer and Wüstenhagen, 2009; Held et al., 2006). 
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Involving the business community 
Twenty-one respondents argued for the involvement of businesses in the design of 
regulatory frameworks from an early stage of development, to ensure their design is informed 
by a “real world” view of how regulations would work in practice, a perspective sometimes 
considered lacking among policy makers.  As one respondent put it: 
"So, that’s why you get this disparity, I believe, of the real-life world because it’s great that 
you sit in your office...typing some text as a regulation, but I really do believe that sometimes 
people need to get out in the real world, out of their office and, probably, out of their comfort 
zones and go and see things, what they mean and understand why maybe industry or whoever 
is complaining." 
By ensuring this, respondents expected that businesses would contribute innovative 
ideas on how to meet environmental objectives, and that fewer problems would emerge later.  
Business involvement was expected to help ensure that where new regulation affects many 
different sectors (e.g. the water industry being affected by waste regulation), that the impact 
on all sectors is taken into account.  Respondents also highlighted the risks of business 
involvement, including a loss of government independence, the possibility that design is 
unduly influenced by large businesses more so than SMEs, and that a repeated call for the 
clarification of requirements could lead to over-prescription.  Effective cooperation between 
government and business requires mutual trust, which can be built through government 
demonstrating that it has listened to industry and by open engagement by officials and 
politicians who are willing to participate in open debate. 
Researchers have found that voluntary agreements provide governments the 
opportunity to better understand and design interventions (Menanteau, 2003; Rezessy and 
Bertoldi, 2011).  However, other stakeholders, including NGOs, may not welcome a closer 
relationship between industry and government, fearing regulatory capture (Pautz, 2010b) or 
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loss of influence (Bomberg, 2007).  The UK government has published best practice 
guidance for regulators to assess the impact of regulatory change (Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills, 2013c) placing significant emphasis on early business engagement, 
aspects of which are addressed through the Environment Agency’s Regulated Business 
Forum and account management approach (Environment Agency, 2013).  While it can be 
anticipated that respondents would welcome these measures, some of the concerns they raise 
regarding policy integration may require more profound reform, which may challenge the 
“integrative capacity” (Rayner and Howlett, 2009) of the UK government to realign existing 
regulatory frameworks. 
 
Role of trade associations 
Trade associations seek to influence policy development, providing regulatory advice 
to members, and working with government agencies to develop guidance tailored to industry 
characteristics.  Often, trade associations establish technical committees that draw on member 
businesses to provide expert input to regulatory reform.  Trade associations have also sought 
to educate politicians, the media and the general public about the environmental performance 
of their sectors.  For example, one personal care products trade association described 
committing resources to informing the media about members’ products to ensure debates 
about safety and environmental impact are informed by scientific evidence.  Respondents 
described cases where trade associations have been able to establish environmental standards 
(e.g. British Retail Consortium packaging standards) and codes of practice (e.g. the Chemical 
Industries Association Responsible Care Programme), or to act as coordinating bodies for 
voluntary agreements (e.g. the National Farmers Union, among others, for the Campaign for 
the Farmed Environment).  Trade associations around the world have played a central role in 
negotiating environmental agreements with governments on behalf of members (Bailey and 
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Rupp, 2005) and in self-regulation (Lenox and Nash, 2003; Nash and Ehrenfeld, 1997). 
However, respondents noted the ability of trade associations to fulfil this role may be limited 
by factors such as competition law, the ability to establish standards that operated across 
national boundaries for businesses operating internationally, whether members were 
sufficiently similar (in size, and/or in business activities undertaken, and/or in levels of 
performance) to have closely aligned common interests, and the skills and resources of staff.  
Several respondents noted that SMEs may not be reached by industry-wide voluntary 
initiatives through this route. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Implications for regulatory reform 
Considering the three research questions raised in the introduction above, the majority of 
industry representatives argued for a tailored mix of instruments to suit the economic and 
environmental context, rather than a preference for or against direct regulation.  Those 
arguing for voluntary approaches prefer flexibility and support for business competitiveness; 
while those sceptical of voluntary approaches doubted their effectiveness and sought the level 
playing field offered by consistently-enforced direct regulation.  The new evidence presented 
here supports calls for policy makers and regulators to choose instruments that are tailored to 
specific industry or business circumstances (Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999).  However, 
instrument selection is only one aspect of regulatory reform.  Our results suggest policy 
makers and regulators should also examine whether regulatory frameworks are coherent, 
balance clarity, prescription and flexibility, are enabled by positive regulatory relationships, 
are administratively efficient, targeted according to risk, evidence-based and are delivering 
long-term stability for regulated businesses.  Failure to address these, which apply across the 
range of instruments, has the potential to undermine the effectiveness of environmental 
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regulation, perhaps even to the extent that the expected benefits of careful instrument choice 
could be lost through poor implementation, as found by others (Testa et al., 2013).  These 
responses have three important implications for regulatory reform and the onward 
development of the transition(s) required to deliver the required outcomes of reform, in 
practice.  
1) Improving the coherence of environmental policy and regulation has become a 
priority in the eyes of most respondents, reflecting the gradual accumulation of new 
policy and regulatory instruments in the UK and EU over recent decades.  Improving 
coherence will be necessary to deliver better regulation in the eyes of business. 
2) In order to improve perceptions of coherence, policy makers and regulators need to 
examine the totality of regulation from the perspective of individual businesses or 
sectors, rather than approaching analysis and reform in the traditional silos of policy 
or regulatory responsibilities assigned by the legal and political system. Respondents 
are keen to engage in this process. 
3) The analytical, institutional and political challenges of improving coherence need to 
be overcome, and incorporated into reform programmes (Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills, 2013b; Ladegaard et al., 2007). Policy analysis needs to reflect 
impacts on multiple sectors.  Regional, national and international government 
institutions need to encourage policy makers and regulators to work together across 
organisational boundaries to coordinate design to improve “integrative capacity” 
(Rayner and Howlett, 2009). Political processes need to decide, rationally and fairly, 
on trade-offs between the interests of different sectors, and to incorporate measures to 
tackle emerging environmental risks without undermining the coherence of the 
existing regulatory framework.  This seems a likely pre-requisite to improving the 
effectiveness, efficiency and fairness of regulatory frameworks in coming years. 
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In terms of the practical aspects of making these transitions, a discussion is now underway on 
the implementation route towards smarter environmental regulation (e.g. see Defra, 2013b).  
The detail is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is clear that the consultations held to date 
have stimulated a valuable debate on the steps required.  Among these are calls for simpler, 
transparent and streamlined communications with government; for a far more overt, risk-
based rationale for regulatory interventions made fit-for purpose; and effective sanctions for 
those that continue to purposefully operate outwith regulatory norms.  Future research 
challenges, especially for policy specialists, might consider the active monitoring of 
organisational behaviours as these reforms take shape. 
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